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Abstract
As the pressure mounts to reduce the public costs of supporting rapidly aging societies, responsibility for
supporting elderly people will increasingly fall on their family members. This essay explores the family’s
capacity to respond to these growing challenges. In particular, we examine how family change and
growing inequality pose special problems in developed nations, especially the United States. This essay
mentions a series of studies supported by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on an Aging
Society that aim to examine the future of intergenerational exchange. We focus particularly on adults who
have dependent and young-adult children and who must also care for elderly parents, a fraction of the
population that will grow substantially in the coming twenty-five years.
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The Future of Intergenerational Relations
in Aging Societies
Frank F. Furstenberg, Caroline Sten Hartnett,
Martin Kohli & Julie M. Zissimopoulos
Abstract: As the pressure mounts to reduce the public costs of supporting rapidly aging societies, responsibility for supporting elderly people will increasingly fall on their family members. This essay explores the
family’s capacity to respond to these growing challenges. In particular, we examine how family change
and growing inequality pose special problems in developed nations, especially the United States. This
essay mentions a series of studies supported by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on an
Aging Society that aim to examine the future of intergenerational exchange. We focus particularly on
adults who have dependent and young-adult children and who must also care for elderly parents, a fraction
of the population that will grow substantially in the coming twenty-½ve years.
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Family systems are among the most enduring and

universal institutions that human beings have devised; in one form or another, they exist in every society as a social arrangement for regulating reproduction, supporting the young, and caring for the
elderly. The survival of family systems stems from
their remarkable ability to transform their structure and practices in response to new demographic,
social, and economic conditions. That the family system has persevered despite the vast global changes
of the last century attests to this resiliency and adaptability. But there are a number of indications that the
family’s capacity to perform its traditional functions
is becoming strained as the pace of social and economic change quickens around the globe.
Family formation and childbearing, robust a halfcentury ago, have slowed to below populationreplacement levels in most developed nations. Marriage has become a less central and stable institution,
making child care more precarious. The breakdown
of the gender-based division of labor has challenged
women and men to develop more complex routines
© 2015 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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for managing work and family roles. Greater parental investment and support is required for childrearing today: lengthier
and increasingly expensive post-secondary education and depressed job prospects
have prolonged young adults’ dependency
on their parents. On the other hand, a rapid
increase in longevity has enlarged the
ranks of the elderly, contributing–along
with the smaller number of the young–
to an increase in their share of the total
population. This adds to the elderly’s capacity to assist younger generations,
though at the same time it increases the
future burdens on younger generations to
support and care for elderly family members when they become frail and incapacitated.
The decline of fertility and growth of
longevity have produced a rapidly aging
society in many parts of the world. This
pattern of population aging will be accentuated as the large cohort of individuals
born after World War II–the baby boomers–reaches seniority. The demographic
pro½le for each wealthy nation differs
depending on the timing of its baby boom
and the magnitude of its baby bust (a
consequence of rapidly decreasing fertility
in the latter third of the last century). Some
are aging sooner or more rapidly than others; these nations have provided some insights about the effects of population aging.
(For more on demographic shifts in the
United States, see S. Jay Olshansky’s essay
in this volume.)
Public systems such as Social Security
and Medicare were devised a century or
more ago partly to relieve some of the economic and social pressures on the family
–midlife parents in particular–to assume
complete responsibility for the care of both
the young and the elderly. Due to population aging, these public support systems
will face considerable pressure in many
societies, including in the United States.
Any reductions in public expenditure will

only increase the burden on working-age
adults already challenged by the temporal
and ½nancial demands of supporting the
elderly while simultaneously having to invest more in caring for and educating the
young. In this essay, we explore whether
families will be up to this task.
We begin this inquiry by briefly summarizing some salient ½ndings on practices of intergenerational support and exchange in economically developed nations.
We will then discuss changing conditions
that are likely to complicate (and possibly
alter or erode) these existing familial relationships and patterns of intergenerational resource allocation. We also examine coping mechanisms families develop
to accommodate intergenerational needs.
In the second part of the paper, we will describe the work of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on an Aging Society, which has devised a series of projects
to explore these social issues linked with
aging societies, and whose work may contribute signi½cantly to the knowledge base
that informs U.S. policy on aging. We conclude by considering some possible dilemmas that policy-makers may face in their
efforts to support families.

A vast amount of research has been done

over the past several decades on how generations within family systems support
and assist each other over time. Patterns
of intergenerational exchange operate
quite differently in traditional societies,
developing countries, and advanced economies. Traditional societies have often devised means of protecting the elderly
generation (G1) by maintaining intergenerational households or mandating that
the middle generation (G2) provide ½nancial support to elderly parents, though older parents (G1) may also continue to assist
their adult children by caring for their offspring (G3) or working. Two distinctive
features of traditional systems are that the
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oldest generation 1) does not survive in
great numbers and 2) produces a relatively
high number of children who can provide
support as they come of age. Moreover, low
geographical mobility tends to keep families in the same locale, ensuring that parents will have surviving children around
to provide support when they are no longer
able to take care of themselves.1
This general pattern of an upward flow
of resources from the middle to the oldest
generation typically persists in developing
countries, though due to the expansion of
labor markets, second-generation members often move away from their birth communities to seek higher incomes. In international migration, this may lead to considerable remittances from G2s to G1s. On
the other hand, children may sometimes
have to be left behind in the care of their
grandparents, especially when mothers
move to wealthier countries (often to
become paid care workers for children or
the elderly). The introduction of old-age
pensions–frequently the ½rst step of public social assistance–greatly improves the
½nancial position of the elderly and may
lead to a reversal of the ½nancial flow by
enabling them to aid the families of their
adult children and help cover the schooling expenses of their grandchildren.2
In nations with advanced economies, the
flow of economic assistance more generally moves downward. Children and grandchildren require more and longer support
due to extended and more costly education and dif½cult transitions into work;
conversely, the elderly are often economically better-off thanks to public support,
savings, and improvements in health care.
In all European nations, parents continue
to provide more economic assistance to
their children and grandchildren than they
receive (at least through their seventies).
This is true even if we include nonmonetary help.3 Children (and possibly grandchildren) often reciprocate by aiding their
144 (2) Spring 2015

parents when they become frail or incapacitated, but are less often called upon to
provide economic assistance to elderly parents (many of whom enjoy the economic
security provided by their social security
bene½ts, pensions, and savings). Those in
need of personal care often ½rst turn to
spouses or partners, but children may also
step in, either as caregivers or as organizers
and monitors of third-party or institutional care.
Admittedly, this is an oversimpli½ed picture of intergenerational exchange in
wealthy countries; there is much variation
both within and across individual nations.
First, the magnitude of public support
varies greatly among welfare systems. Second, countries also differ in terms of the
forms of their support systems (familybased versus individualized).4 Third, the
flow of resources works differently across
different economic strata. Among the poor
and near-poor, children may be called upon to help out both economically and nonmonetarily throughout their lives and cannot readily afford to purchase assistance
for older relatives, as might be common
among the more privileged. Fourth, there
is a great deal of evidence showing that racial and ethnic differences correlate with
different patterns of support and exchange.5 Some ethnic groups are much
more likely to maintain intergenerational
households in which the volume of support
and assistance is more intense and reciprocal over time.6 (Interestingly, however,
there is a paucity of evidence on the workings of intergenerational households in
contemporary societies.) Finally, divorce
and remarriage affect the amount of support provided both downward and upward
throughout the life course. Divorced fathers not infrequently lose contact with
some or all of their children, who in turn
are unwilling or unavailable to assist their
fathers in later life. Stepfathers may ½ll in
to some extent, but there is strong evidence
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that children feel less obligated to care for
elderly stepparents than parents.7
As we contemplate a potential retreat of
public systems of assistance for the elderly
in the next several decades, there are sound
reasons to be concerned about families’
ability to pick up the slack. This is especially true in the United States, where the
population is becoming more economically strati½ed, more ethnically diverse, and
more varied in its family forms.

I

mpending demographic change in the
size of elderly and middle-aged cohorts
drives much of the concern about the pressures likely to mount on parents in midlife
and late midlife (roughly ages forty-½ve
to sixty-four).8 These middle-aged parents
(mothers especially) are often called the
“sandwiched generation,” squeezed by the
simultaneous demands of supporting their
children, assisting a frail elderly parent, and
being in the labor force. Some argue that
this term exaggerates the pressure faced by
this generation, because many parents take
active steps to avoid being in this position
or do not have to ½ll all three roles at once.
Nonetheless, it is highly likely that a substantial percentage of families will face
these circumstances in the next two or
three decades. Though there is little research describing the incidence and duration of episodes of being “sandwiched” for
middle-aged adults, we know that about
one-third of women in late middle age (between ½fty-½ve and sixty-nine) report giving support to both children and parents at
some point.9 This is likely to increase, since
the proportion of adults who have both
children and living parents is rising.10
The number of elderly (including parents, parents-in-law, and stepparents) who
survive to become incapacitated or frail
will increase as the baby-boom cohort
advances into their later years in the next
several decades. This poses a new challenge
for the reconciliation of family and work,
34

similar to that faced by young parents. At
the same time, unless current patterns of
family formation rapidly reverse–and
there is no reason to expect that they will–
a rising number of young adults will not
begin having children until their thirties
or even later. More than one-third of births
are now to women over thirty, and the
average age at ½rst birth has risen steadily,
from twenty-one in 1970 to nearly twentysix in 2012.11 Not all of these young adults
remain dependents while forming partnerships and having children, but many do
receive partial or complete support from
their parents in their early adult years. The
proportion of young adults being assisted
by their parents has been steadily rising
over the past several decades.12 Were this
pattern of the prolongation of early adulthood to continue, it would result in an even
greater level of “sandwiching,” mandating
that a growing proportion of midlife adults
divide time and resources between their
parents, their children, and possibly even
their grandchildren.
These demographic trends of greater
longevity and later family-formation are
compounded by rapid changes in marriage
practices that have tended to make family
obligations more uncertain. Compared to
four or ½ve decades ago, young adults marry later and divorce more often, making cohabitation and remarriage more common
and socially acceptable. Marriage has become a less central institution for organizing childbearing than it was a half-century
ago; a growing proportion of children are
born out of wedlock, often into cohabiting
unions (which are less stable family forms,
particularly in the United States).13
We know all too little about felt obligations to extended kin in varied family circumstances. Existing evidence suggests
that marriage–especially a ½rst marriage–
confers a greater sense of obligation to inlaws than do consensual unions.14 Cohabitation may offer a more discretionary and
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conditional commitment to both the part- contact between fathers and children.19
ners and their extended kin. The growing Family units are more complex, often connumber of remarriages and cohabitations taining step- or surrogate parents and halfafter a ½rst marriage may result in weaker siblings.20 Coresidence among three genobligations to in-laws and quasi–in-laws, erations is a common adaptive strategy
reducing the level of support to in-laws for managing economic pressures and the
that accompanied marriages in the past.
greater need for assistance by kin.21 At
As mentioned earlier, an ever-greater the same time, the elderly have signi½cantfraction of children are growing up with ly shorter life spans, suggesting that pressporadic or limited contact with their bio- sures on midlife parents (often matriarchs
logical fathers (and a smaller but rising charged with keeping the family together)
number instead have limited contact with are considerable. Cutbacks in public suptheir biological mothers, or have little con- port most acutely affect these overburtact with either parent). As stated previ- dened families, and it is unclear how parously, the evidence strongly suggests that ents will be able to invest adequately in
children with limited contact with their their children while supporting frail parfathers are–not unsurprisingly–far less ents or grandparents (shorter generations
likely to provide assistance to them when result in more four-generation families in
they become elderly.15 A third trend asso- this segment of the population, owing to
ciated with family change may also affect earlier childbearing ages).
the availability of support for older people
Issues facing the privileged are likely to
in the future: childlessness has been rising be less acute, if only because of their greater
rapidly in many nations with advanced resources for purchasing assistance when
economies, including the United States, needed. Nonetheless, many will face an
where close to one-sixth of all women in overlap between demands from children
their forties are currently childless.16 For- and from elder parents and in-laws. Aftunately, much of the research on this topic fluent parents tend to provide high levels of
suggests that the childless are not neces- support to young adult children and at
sarily stranded in old age because many the same time have parents with relatively
acquire surrogate caregivers who may or high life expectancies.22 As greater nummay not be kin.17 Nonetheless, the relative bers of baby-boomers reach old age, afflushortage of children among people enter- ent parents will have to contend with the
ing midlife may eventually reduce the declining health of their parents and inamount of assistance and care available to laws while they are still launching their
certain subsets of the elderly.
young-adult children.
The constellation of family changes has
Families of modest and moderate means
not been uniformly distributed; markedly –the middle third of the economic distridifferent family forms exist across the so- bution–face a different situation, at least
cial strata. As inequality has widened in the in countries with limited social safety
United States and elsewhere, family prac- nets such as the United States. They are
tices among the privileged, the disadvan- squeezed economically because, though
taged, and those in the middle have become they are ineligible for public assistance,
more pronounced and distinct from one they may have obligations to ½nancially
another.18
assist their older parents and adult chilDisadvantaged families are generally dren (who may themselves be ineligible
formed earlier, typically outside of mar- for social services). So-called middle-class
riage, and they are less stable, with less families may well feel the effects of an
144 (2) Spring 2015
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aging society most acutely. It seems likely
that more of these families will adopt the
coresidence strategy of low-income households in an effort to pool their resources.
It is impossible to know how economic
growth and wage trajectories for various
job sectors will mitigate the pressures on
families in different countries twenty or
thirty years out; however, the prospects do
not look especially bright, given that many
advanced economies are struggling to
maintain the robust economic growth
necessary for a good labor market of young
and middle-aged adults that are capable
of helping to support the oldest generation.
Perhaps older persons–who are in better
health than previous generations–will be
more amenable to remaining in the labor
force through their late sixties and early
seventies, both to improve their own circumstances and to contribute resources to
younger generations.
This much we do know: large parts of
the future elderly are likely to be less affluent than current cohorts of individuals
over sixty-½ve. And, in all likelihood, many
of their children will be less well off in their
middle years than their parents were at the
same age. Young adults today are as welleducated (or better-educated) than their
parents were, but they are entering adulthood with more debt and more modest
labor-market prospects.

These speculations about the future of

intergenerational relations are informed
by current research, but there are still many
unknowns. The demographic growth of
the elderly population, followed by a far
smaller cohort of younger and middle-aged
adults, is ½xed, but we do not know exactly
how these cohorts will look in another
twenty or thirty years as the baby-boom
cohort ages. They will certainly be more
ethnically diverse, but whether current
trends in economic inequality and family
change will persist is less clear.

36

What will the health and economic status of future Americans be? How will the
circumstances of the elderly be affected by
trends in health and disease and changes in
family structure, educational attainment,
and public and family support systems?
The answers to these questions depend
on a range of alternative future scenarios,
each with a different set of costs and bene½ts. Economic and demographic modeling is a useful tool that provides a simpli½ed representation of our future reality.
A team of researchers from the MacArthur Network in collaboration with the
Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California has been building such a model:
the Future Americans Model (fam). fam
is a simulation model that uses data on
groups of Americans over age twenty-½ve
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the Health and Retirement Study in order to understand the short- and long-term
implications of changes across cohorts on
well-being from birth through death. This
model expands on the technical infrastructure and expertise the researchers developed while building and using a similar
model, the Future Elderly Model (fem).
Researchers from the Network are also
using the fem to quantify the value of current and future intergenerational support
and resource-exchange for Americans aged
sixty-½ve and older. They are simulating
the effects of changes in public assistance
(via Social Security and Medicare) on these
exchanges of money and time across familial generations. Looking forward, the Network researchers’ work will deepen our understanding of future intergenerational
exchange and support by anticipating future changes to the family.
Part of the challenge of building the Future Americans Model is taking into account the ways in which new family patterns will emerge for each age stratum in
the next twenty years. But predicting fam-
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ily forms is fraught with challenges. For
this reason, the Network has given a grant
to a second team of researchers (headed by
Chris Sepaki and including Andrew Cherlin, Emily Agee, and Douglas Wolfe) to
build a framework for exploring how family forms may evolve over the decades. Such
changes may also vary over socioeconomic
strata (as well as family forms), affecting
the potential flow of family assistance in
the near future. The team will begin with
different assumptions and an alternate approach to that of the fam team, using current information about the type and pace
of changes in marriage, cohabitation, and
fertility within and outside of wedlock.
Both teams are exchanging information so
that they can determine whether and how
different assumptions about family change
and the growth of inequality may affect
public and private demands for health care
and economic support. In the next year,
they plan to publish the results from these
simulations.
This information will, in turn, give the
½rst team (which is modeling future patterns of costs and care for the elderly) a
more speci½c and nuanced understanding
of how demands on midlife parents and
their children may overlap with the needs
of the baby-boom generation as they age
and require greater assistance from their
families.
A third project, supported jointly by the
Network and the Pew Foundation, involves
data collection on a largely unexplored issue: how families in societies with more
advanced population aging–such as Germany and Italy–are managing to deal with
the simultaneous demands of caring for
their children and their elderly parents. The
emphasis is on measuring unmet or partially met needs of individuals in the family unit. As we discussed earlier, we anticipate that, in an aging society, midlife parents in particular will face demands for
assistance that are beyond their capacity
144 (2) Spring 2015

to meet them. How do parents respond?
Do they call on additional relatives such as
grandchildren or siblings to help out? Do
they look to public services? Or does the
demand simply go unmet? The Network
will compare the patterns in these already
“older” societies with the circumstances
of midlife parents in the United States.
To supplement this survey, researchers
supported by the Network will be conducting in-depth interviews of family members
in a three-generation qualitative study carried out by human development researcher
Karen Fingerman and her colleagues.23
The aim of this research is to examine in
depth how exchanges of support are initiated and responded to in daily life when the
oldest generation begins to need more assistance. In research on intergenerational
exchange, very little attention has been
paid to the needs families are unable to
meet and what might remedy this shortfall. This qualitative research may help us
understand how and when gaps occur between the needs of the elderly and the supply of assistance.
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This essay has sketched a picture of a de-

mographic future that may pose considerable challenges for family systems in Western nations that during the twentieth century worked to strike a balance between
public and private support. That balance
is likely to change, and the economic and
health costs of supporting the elderly generation while investing in younger generations will become formidable over the next
thirty years. We have observed that this task
is likely to become more complex with the
aging of the baby-boom cohort, changes
in family systems, and the growing strati½cation of social classes and ethnic groups.
Despite this essay’s overarching focus
on the problems, there are some silver linings to the current demographic situation.
The relative paucity of children (G3s) compared to the elderly (G1s) could mean that
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although seniors will be less ½nancially
well-off on average, there will be a larger
cohort of them to provide assistance to
their children and grandchildren. The ratio
of seniors to grandchildren is likely to soar
in the next ½fteen to twenty years, suggesting the possibility of a greater flow of parent and grandparent assistance before the
older generation requires assistance, by
which point grandchildren may have become a more potent source of assistance to
the elderly. In fact, we know very little
about how flows of assistance to the young
are reciprocated over longer stretches of
time.
We do not dismiss the possibility that signi½cant social, economic, and demographic changes could alter the rather bleak sce-

nario of declining support for the elderly
that we have projected. Nonetheless, the
American public, unlike its European counterparts, appears to be relatively unaware
of the looming problems facing it as the
baby-boom cohort reaches an advanced
age.24 The pressures on an already overburdened and rapidly changing family system suggest that we could begin to see a
diminution (if not a full reversal) of the
downward flows of assistance from elderly
parents and relatives to younger generations. Were this to happen, it could restrict
social mobility and become an added
source of inequality in the United States,
which is already among the most socioeconomically unequal of all economically
developed nations.
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